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Does Section 2(b) Really Make a 
Difference? Part 1: Freedom of 
Expression, Defamation Law and  
the Journalist-Source Privilege 
Jamie Cameron* 
I. DANCING IN THE STREETS 
New York Times v. Sullivan was “an occasion for dancing in the 
streets”, because that is when the U.S. Supreme Court finally declared 
the Sedition Act of 1798 unconstitutional.1 Sullivan also took a revolu-
tionary step in constitutionalizing the law of defamation and conferring 
protection on those who publish false statements about public officers.2 
In explaining how the Court’s malice rule serves the First Amendment’s 
vital purposes, Brennan J. wrote some of the most memorable passages 
in the U.S. free speech tradition.3 
Decades later, the Supreme Court of Canada introduced a defence for 
“public interest responsible communication” (“PIRC”).4 Though less 
generous than Sullivan’s malice rule, the defence allows those who pub-
lish false, defamatory statements to avoid liability by establishing that 
* Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, and co-chair of the 13th Annual Constitutional
Cases Conference. 
1 376 U.S. 254 (1964) [hereinafter “Sullivan”]. Harry Kalven, “The New York Times Case: 
A Note on ‘the Central Meaning of the First Amendment’”, [1964] S. Ct. Law Rev. 191, at 221, note 
125 (quoting Alexander Meiklejohn). 
2 Sullivan introduced the malice rule, which protects defamatory statements about public 
officers, and public figures under subsequent decisions, unless the statements are made with “actual 
malice” — knowledge of falseness or with reckless disregard of their status as true or false. Sullivan, 
id. 
3 Kalven predicted that Sullivan “may prove to be the best and most important [opinion the 
Court] has ever produced in the realm of freedom of speech”; supra, note 1, at 194.  
4 Grant v. Torstar Corp., [2009] S.C.J. No. 61, 2009 SCC 61 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Grant”]; Cusson v. Quan, [2009] S.C.J. No. 62, 2009 SCC 62 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cusson”] 
(December 22, 2009). The Court discussed and defined the PIRC defence in Grant, which is the 
leading decision as a result. See P. Downard, “The Defence of Responsible Communication”, in this 
volume; B. Tarantino, “Chasing Reputation — The Argument for Differential Treatment of ‘Public 
Figures’ in Canadian Defamation Law” (2010) 48 Osgoode Hall L.J. (forthcoming, fall 2010). 
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the work addresses a matter of public interest and satisfies a standard of 
“responsible communication”.5 The Supreme Court’s decisions in Grant 
v. Torstar Corp. and Cusson v. Quan were hailed as a key victory for the
media and a major advance in defamation law. Yet, as the Ottawa Citi-
zen’s lawyer declared, if the Court had not taken that step the law in this 
country would be “in the Dark Ages”.6 The Court itself admitted that 
Canada’s law of defamation lagged behind that of its common law 
peers.7 It was a remarkable feat, considering that others, such as the 
United Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia, do not have a constitu-
tional bill of rights. Rather than place it in the vanguard, the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms held the law of defamation in this coun-
try back.8 If there were celebratory jigs when Grant and Cusson were 
decided, there were sighs of relief as well. 
In its first look at defamation under the Charter in 1995, the Court 
got its priorities wrong and put reputation ahead of expressive freedom. 
Justice Cory wrote forcefully in Hill v. Church of Scientology that the 
law of defamation did not require modification, because false, defama-
tory statements have minimal value and do not offset the law’s interest in 
protecting reputation.9 In this way, the Charter unexpectedly served as a 
negative force, and the evolution of doctrine came to a halt after Church 
of Scientology. Meantime, the House of Lords in the U.K. introduced the 
concept of responsible journalism in Reynolds v. Times Newspapers, and 
courts in Australia, New Zealand and South Africa found other ways to 
strengthen expressive freedom in defamation law’s balancing of inter-
ests.10 
Twice in recent years the Supreme Court stepped away from Church 
of Scientology with corrections of its own. First it modernized the fair 
5 The Court proposed a two-part test and listed seven elements of “responsible communica-
tion”, but cautioned that the list was not exhaustive of the criteria for determining that question. 
Grant, id., at para. 126 (summarizing the criteria). 
6 P. McGrath, “Canada’s Supreme Court establishes new libel defence”, The National Post 
(December 23, 2009) (quoting Ottawa Citizen lawyer Richard Deardon). 
7 Grant, supra, note 4, at paras. 66, 69, and 85. 
8 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
9 Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] S.C.J. No. 64, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Church of Scientology” or “Scientology”]. The Court did expand the definition 
of qualified privilege to include pleadings not yet filed; infra, note 28. 
10
 See Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1999] 4 All E.R. 609 [hereinafter “Reynolds”] 
and Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL, [2007] 1 A.C. 359 [hereinafter “Jameel”]; for de-
velopments in other countries see Grant, supra, note 4, at paras. 77-85. 
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comment doctrine in WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson,11 and then it introduced 
the PIRC defence in Grant and Cusson. Though these decisions gave 
expressive freedom a lift in the defamation calculus, all three arose under 
the common law and none were Charter cases per se. Each time the 
Court cited section 2(b)’s underlying values, but failed to take the next 
step of importing Charter analysis or standards into the common law. On 
the question of fair comment, for instance, WIC Radio turned to Dickson 
J.’s dissent in Cherneskey v. Armadale Publishers, which was decided 
before the Charter.12 Then Grant imported a British doctrine into domes-
tic law without considering whether modifications to accommodate the 
Charter were necessary.  
The Court’s approach in these cases stands in contrast with Dagenais 
v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, which developed a constitutional 
doctrine when the common law failed to protect expressive freedom.13 
The issue there was whether a publication ban should be granted to pro-
tect an accused’s right to a fair trial. After noting that fair trial held the 
advantage at common law, Lamer C.J.C. held that the test had to be re-
balanced and constitutionalized to protect freedom of expression. Under 
the Charter, a publication ban cannot be granted to protect an accused’s 
right to a fair trial, unless prescribed constitutional requirements are 
met.14 In this way, Dagenais set a vibrant and demanding standard of 
justification for limits on expressive freedom. As such, it stands as an 
exemplar of Charter methodology and has served as a model in other 
settings, including the exercise of discretion under statutory provisions.15 
                                                                                                             
11
 [2008] S.C.J. No. 41, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 420 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “WIC Radio”]. With Mat-
thew Milne-Smith and John McCamus, I appeared as counsel for the Canadian Civil Liberties 
Association (“CCLA”) as an intervener in the appeal at the Supreme Court of Canada.  
12
 [1978] S.C.J. No. 115, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 1067 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cherneskey”]. 
13
 [1994] S.C.J. No. 104, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dagenais”].  
14
 The Court developed a common law test which incorporated the requirements of the 
Oakes test (R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.)): 
[A] publication ban cannot be granted unless (a) such a ban is necessary in order to pre-
vent a real and substantial risk to the fairness of the trial, because reasonably available 
alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and (b) the salutary effects of the publica-
tion ban outweigh the deleterious effects to the free expression of those affected by the 
ban.  
Id., at 878 (emphasis in original). 
15
 See also Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] 
S.C.J. No. 38, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480 (S.C.C.); R. v. Mentuck, [2001] S.C.J. No. 73, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 
442 (S.C.C.); R. v. O.N.E., [2001] S.C.J. No. 74, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 478 (S.C.C.); Re Vancouver Sun, 
[2004] S.C.J. No. 41, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332 (S.C.C.); and Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario, 
[2005] S.C.J. No. 41, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188 (S.C.C.). 
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The Court’s most recent decisions on expressive freedom and the 
common law bear little resemblance to Dagenais. In WIC Radio and 
Grant, as well as in R. v. National Post,16 the Court discussed section 
2(b)’s underlying values approvingly, but took no steps to incorporate 
constitutional standards into common law doctrine. The question this 
article poses, as a result, is whether the Charter really made a difference 
in these cases.17 Specifically, it asks whether the common law must adopt 
Charter-specific doctrines or remedies when Charter values are at stake.  
The discussion focuses on the Court’s defamation decisions, but in-
cludes brief remarks about R. v. National Post, which considered whether 
the Wigmore test for a journalist-source privilege is consistent with the 
Charter. It begins in the next section by showing not only that Church of 
Scientology had a chilling effect on the law of defamation, but also that it 
influenced the Court’s perception of the relationship between the com-
mon law and the Charter. The section which follows discusses WIC 
Radio, the fair comment case that facilitated the transition from Church 
of Scientology to Grant. There, the Court began to distance itself from 
Scientology’s defence of reputation, but remained unwilling to reconcep-
tualize the fair comment doctrine. The central part of the article considers 
Grant and the decision to create a new defence in the law of defamation. 
With Church of Scientology as the baseline, the PIRC defence must be 
seen as a step forward. Yet, by uncritically adopting the British doctrine 
of responsible journalism, the Supreme Court chose to follow rather than 
to lead, and to settle for a common law solution in lieu of a Charter-
specific standard.18 
In upholding coercive searches against the press under the Criminal 
Code,19 the Court’s most recent decision in National Post rejected the 
section 2(b) claim, and refused to alter or constitutionalize the common 
law test for journalist-source privilege. Once again the Court paid its  
                                                                                                             
16
 [2010] S.C.J. No. 16, 2010 SCC 16 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “National Post”]. I appeared be-
fore the Supreme Court of Canada in this case, again on behalf of the CCLA, and with Matthew 
Milne-Smith and John McCamus.  
17
 This article is the first of two, which together explore the question, “Do Constitutional 
Rights Really Make a Difference? Expressive Freedom under Section 2(b) of Canada’s Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms” (presented at the Centre for Comparative Constitutional Studies, University 
of Melbourne law faculty, February 25, 2010). The title derives from the late Justice Bertha Wilson’s 
famous speech at Osgoode Hall Law School, “Will Women Judges Really Make A Difference?” 
(1990) 28 Osgoode Hall L.J. 507. 
18
 Though it is called responsible communication, rather than responsible journalism, the 
Supreme Court’s PIRC defence is virtually indistinguishable from its British counterpart. Infra, note 
81. 
19
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
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respects to the Charter, but held that it was unnecessary to re-work the 
Wigmore test or set it in a constitutional framework. Though section 2(b) 
may influence the balancing of values in determining the existence of a 
privilege, the law remains the same and journalist-source relationships 
are without constitutional status.  
National Post confirms the Court’s ongoing reluctance to harmonize 
the common law and the Charter. On all three questions discussed in this 
article — namely, fair comment, qualified privilege, and the journalist-
source relationship — the Court could, and should, have followed 
Dagenais and made constitutional adjustments to common law doctrine. 
Instead, the Court held that it suffices for section 2(b)’s values to be 
taken into account in a discretionary, informal and unstructured way, 
when expressive freedom is balanced against other interests. If the Char-
ter made a difference in these cases, it was only at the margins, and not in 
the design and content of doctrine. The Court’s reluctance to consider 
common law reforms which directly respond to the Charter’s require-
ments suggests that judge-made solutions are not the answer, and points 
to the need for legislative reform in the law of defamation, as well as on 
the question of journalist-source relationships, or the reporter’s privilege. 
II. CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY: A GOOD REPUTATION IS  
“CHERISHED ABOVE ALL”20  
It is too late to turn the clock back now, and ask what Canada’s law 
of defamation might have looked like if the Court had not pushed back as 
it did in Hill v. Church of Scientology. Shortly after introducing the 
Dagenais test in a criminal setting, the Court reacted with hostility to the 
suggestion that the tort of defamation should be constitutionalized. Jus-
tice Cory’s reasons in Church of Scientology began by finding that the 
Charter did not apply, as the litigation was between private parties and 
did not engage the plaintiff’s status or responsibilities as a public offi-
cer.21 In this way he discounted the Charter, though the plaintiff held 
public office and the defamatory comments addressed his actions as a 
Crown Attorney. Albeit malicious, Scientology’s critique nonetheless 
                                                                                                             
20
 Church of Scientology, supra, note 9, at para. 107.  
21
 Id., at paras. 65-82 (stating, at para. 72, that “[t]he fact that persons are employed by the 
government does not mean that their reputation is divided into two parts, one related to their per-
sonal life and the other to their employment status”, and adding, that “[r]eputation is an integral and 
fundamentally important aspect of every individual” which “exists for everyone quite apart from 
employment”).  
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spoke to section 2(b)’s core values: the accountability of government, 
Crown prosecutors and the justice system.  
After pre-empting the Charter, Cory J. conducted an analysis of 
Charter values which minimized their influence on the common law.22 
Before doing so, he spoke of the need for a formal distinction between 
Charter rights and Charter values, and stated that the Court should take 
care “not to expand the application of the Charter”.23 Justice Cory also 
stressed that in “private” litigation the party relying on the common law 
should not be required to defend prevailing doctrine. Rather, it rests on 
those who challenge the common law not only to show that doctrine is 
inconsistent with the Charter, but also to demonstrate that it is unjustifi-
able and must be modified.24  
Having created those obstacles to reform, Cory J. undertook a weigh-
ing of values that gave expressive freedom no additional protection 
because of the Charter. To the contrary, he marginalized the expressive 
activity at stake and enhanced the status of reputation in the process. 
Though reputation was already ahead at common law, the “contextual 
approach” in section 2(b) decision-making contemplated a comparative 
assessment of values.25 When Cory J. applied that methodology to the 
“twin values” at issue in Church of Scientology, the contrast could 
scarcely have been greater. He wrote in glowing terms about reputation, 
describing it as an attribute to be “cherished above all”, and pronouncing 
its protection a matter “of fundamental importance to our democratic 
society”.26 At the same time, he discounted defamatory statements as be-
ing “tenuously related to the core values which underlie s. 2(b)”, and 
declared such statements to be “detrimental to the advancement of those 
values and harmful to the interests of a free and democratic society”.27 
Though freedom of expression is protected by the Charter and reputation 
is not, Cory J. concluded that “there is no need to amend or alter” the 
                                                                                                             
22
 Id., at paras. 90-99. 
23
 Id., at para. 95. 
24
 Id., at para. 98. 
25
 See Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 124, [1989] 2 
S.C.R. 1326 (S.C.C.), per Wilson J., concurring; R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 
S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.) (developing the “contextual approach” as a speech-limiting methodology). For a 
critical comment on the contextual approach and on Church of Scientology, see J. Cameron, “The 
Past, Present and Future of Expressive Freedom Under the Charter” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1, 
especially at 33-42. 
26
 Church of Scientology, supra, note 9, at paras. 107 and 120; see also id., at paras. 107-
121 (explaining the importance of reputation).  
27
 Id., at para. 106; see also id., at paras. 101-106 (discussing expressive freedom). 
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common law of defamation.28 From there he went on to find fault with 
the Sullivan rule,29 confirm the status quo,30 and reject a cap on dam-
ages.31  
Justice Cory did not conceal his distaste for the Church of Scientol-
ogy’s behaviour, and nor was he reluctant to show his sympathy for 
Casey Hill.32 The plaintiff was a lawyer, a Crown attorney, and an officer 
of the court who became a judge, and the Church of Scientology’s at-
tacks against him were egregiously and knowingly false. Yet the jury 
verdict and award, which included aggravated and punitive damages, 
meant that the Court did not have to choose between a deserving plaintiff 
and reforms to the law.33 Though modifications would not have disturbed 
the verdict, the Court insisted that the law of defamation did not need to 
accommodate the Charter.34  
Church of Scientology placed a chill on expressive freedom which 
was reinforced by Botiuk v. Toronto Free Press, which was decided a few 
months later,35 and R. v. Lucas, which upheld the Criminal Code’s de-
famatory libel provision.36 Justice Cory’s majority opinion in Lucas once 
again focused on the target of the remarks, and in doing so overlooked 
                                                                                                             
28
 Id., at para. 141 (emphasis added). Justice Cory expanded the concept of qualified privi-
lege to a lawyer’s publication of allegations contained in pleadings which had not yet been filed; id., 
at paras. 149-154.  
29
 Id., at paras. 122-133 (stating, at para. 127, that the actual malice rule “has been severely 
criticized by American judges and academic writers”, and that the decision may have been “overly 
influenced by the dramatic facts underlying the dispute” and “has not stood the test of time” as a 
result). 
30
 Id., at para. 137 (stating, “I simply cannot see that the law of defamation is unduly restric-
tive or inhibiting”, and adding, at para. 141, that “the common law … complies with the underlying 
values of the Charter”). 
31
 Id., at paras. 167-173. 
32
 See id., at paras. 178 and 166 (stating that “[i]t would be hard to imagine a more difficult 
situation for the defamed person to overcome”), as well as para. 156 (describing the Scientology 
lawyer’s conduct as “high-handed and careless”), and para. 184 (declaring, in summary, that “every 
aspect of this case demonstrates the very real and persistent malice of Scientology”). 
33
 Id., at para. 194 (upholding aggravated damages because “every aspect of this case dem-
onstrates the real and persistent malice of Scientology”), and at para. 200 (stating that Scientology’s 
conduct was “so outrageous” that it “cried out for the imposition of punitive damages”). 
34
 See, e.g., Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (1994), 124 A.L.R. 1 (H.C.A.) 
(the Court cited Theophanous, id., at para. 135, to show that Australia had also rejected Sullivan, but 
without considering an alternative to the malice rule, because Church of Scientology did not involve 
the media or deal with political commentary about government policies; id., at 139).  
35
 Botiuk v. Toronto Free Press Publications Ltd., [1995] S.C.J. No. 69, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 3 
(S.C.C.). Scientology was decided on July 20, 1995, and Botiuk, on September 21, 1995. Like Scien-
tology, Botiuk upheld the libel claim, including an award of aggravated damages, and rejected the 
defence of qualified privilege. 
36
 [1998] S.C.J. No. 28, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 439 (S.C.C.) (with the exception of s. 299(c), up-
holding ss. 298, 299 and 300 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46). 
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the connection between a placard accusing a police officer of misdeeds, 
and the public interest in holding law enforcement officers accountable. 
The placard was offensive, but the defendants were seeking redress for a 
miscarriage of justice, and the Code provisions, in any event, were 
flawed.  
In combination, these decisions entrenched the view that defamatory 
statements are valueless and do not deserve protection under the Char-
ter.37 Justice Cory’s opinions in Church of Scientology, Botiuk and Lucas 
were so unequivocal that it was difficult for the Court to attempt change, 
no matter how modest or incremental. Several years would pass before 
the Supreme Court was willing to take another look, and by then substan-
tial changes in the law of defamation had taken place elsewhere. In the 
circumstances, almost any modification of Canadian doctrine would rep-
resent a step forward for expressive freedom. For that reason, the issue in 
this article is not whether WIC Radio and the PIRC cases marked pro-
gress, as both did. More to the point, the question is whether these 
decisions give expressive freedom the protection that is required by the 
Charter. The discussion which follows suggests that there is reason to 
doubt that they do.  
III. WIC RADIO: PUBLIC CONTROVERSY IS A ROUGH TRADE38 
The fair comment doctrine applies to opinions or comments, rather 
than statements of fact, and allows the publisher to avoid responsibility 
for stating a point of view on a matter of public interest, as long as the 
opinion is based on facts and is grounded in an “honest belief”. 39 When 
the doctrine reached the top Court in WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, it was the 
first time since Cherneskey, and the first time under the Charter.40 It is re-
markable that Cherneskey survived almost 30 years, given the Court’s 
decision in that case to hold a newspaper liable for publishing a letter to 
the editor. Fair comment was not available to the publisher there because 
of a gap in the evidence. The authors of the offending letter did not appear 
as witnesses at trial, and the newspaper and its editor quickly distanced 
                                                                                                             
37
 But see R. v. Zundel, [1992] S.C.J. No. 70, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 (S.C.C.) (invalidating the 
Criminal Code prohibition on the wilful spreading of false news). 
38
 WIC Radio, supra, note 11, at para. 15. 
39
 Id., at para. 1 (outlining the elements of the doctrine). Fair comment is subject to malice 
and will not be available where the plaintiff proves that the defendant acted with malice in publish-
ing a defamatory comment. 
40
 Cherneskey, supra, note 12. 
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themselves from the letter’s opinion that the plaintiff — Cherneskey — 
was a racist.41 Fair comment could not be established without evidence 
of honest belief, and that created a dilemma for newspapers which were 
left with two choices, both undesirable. To avoid liability for letters to 
the editor, a newspaper could satisfy honest belief either by adopting 
every point of view it published, or not publishing opinions it disagreed 
with at all. Cherneskey was so chilling that a number of legislatures 
moved quickly to enact measures reversing the Court’s decision.42  
WIC Radio was the first defamation case to reach the Supreme Court 
after Church of Scientology and Botiuk, but fair comment and honest be-
lief, not false statements of fact, were the key variables. The appeal was 
brought from a B.C. Court of Appeal decision rejecting fair comment in 
the case of a radio editorial against an anti-gay activist.43 At trial, the 
judge found that listeners could have concluded that the talk show host, 
Rafe Mair, thought the plaintiff condoned the use of violence against 
gays.44 Mair neither believed nor expressed that view but was held re-
sponsible as if he had, because that is how some listeners might have 
interpreted his remarks.45 
It was unclear whether the Supreme Court would take a different ap-
proach to fair comment, or show the same solicitude for reputation in 
WIC Radio as in Church of Scientology. In finding for the defendants, 
Binnie J.’s majority opinion spoke of balancing an overly solicitous re-
gard for personal reputation against the risk of allowing reputation to 
become “unavoidable road kill on the highway of public controversy”.46 
Unlike Cory J., who found little or no redeeming value in defamatory 
statements, Binnie J. readily supported “freewheeling debate” on matters 
of public interest, and recognized that the tort, as defined, had a chilling 
effect which led to “inappropriate censorship and self-censorship”.47 He 
                                                                                                             
41
 Id., at 1088 (stating, per Ritchie J., that fair comment does not apply where “there is no 
evidence as to the honest belief of the writers of the letter, and the newspaper and its publisher have 
disavowed any such belief on their part”).  
42
 See R. Martin, “Libel and Letters to the Editor” (1983-84) 9 Queen’s L.J. 188 (comment-
ing on Cherneskey and reporting that by 1980 four provinces and two territories had passed 
legislation to overrule the decision). 
43
 [2006] B.C.J. No. 1315, 55 B.C.L.R. (4th) 30 (B.C.C.A.). 
44
 WIC Radio, supra, note 11, at para. 10. 
45
 Id., at para. 9 (describing Mair’s testimony that no imputations of violence by Simpson 
were either intended by him or in fact made by him). At the B.C. Court of Appeal, Southin J.A. also 
denied Mair the benefit of fair comment because a factual foundation is a requisite element of fair 
comment, and she found that there was no factual foundation for the imputation that Simpson would 
condone violence; id., at para. 13 (summarizing Southin J.A.’s reasoning). 
46
 Id., at para. 2. 
47
 Id., at paras. 2 and 15. 
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was prepared to adjust the balance on expressive freedom’s side of the 
ledger, but not through the agency of the Charter. In that regard he fol-
lowed Church of Scientology in describing the litigation as a “private law 
case that is not governed directly by the [Charter]”,48 and otherwise made 
limited reference to the Charter.49 Also, citing Dagenais for the proposi-
tion that there should be no hierarchy of values enabled him to treat 
reputation as expressive freedom’s equal, though it is not.50  
On the merits, Binnie J. was strongly opposed to any proposal to 
eliminate the honest belief requirement. Once he described it as the “car-
dinal test” of fair comment, it followed that abolishing honest belief 
could not be regarded as an instance of incremental change.51 In defend-
ing this part of the fair comment doctrine, he reflected that a standard of 
reasonableness or proportionality for comments and opinions might be 
less favourable for expressive freedom than a requirement of honesty. In 
any event, he noted that the requirement rested on the view that it is “not 
too much to ask a defamer to profess an honest belief in his or her de-
famatory comment”.52 In principle, the law gives effect to expressive 
freedom on matters of public interest “[i]f the speaker, however mis-
guided, spoke with integrity”.53 The suggestion that fair comment only 
protects those who speak with integrity is foreign to any version of the 
common law that is informed by the Charter.  
It is clear that Binnie J. viewed subjective honest belief as a justifi-
able restriction on expressive freedom. After finding that Mair’s editorial 
“clearly defamed” the plaintiff Simpson, he stated that “it was entirely 
proper to have Mair go into the witness box to affirm his honest belief in 
what he had said about her”.54 Though proper, it was nevertheless unfair 
because the editorial’s “sting” — that the plaintiff condoned violence — 
could only be attributed to Mair by imputation. Preventing that fairness 
was a simple matter of adopting the Cherneskey dissent and substituting 
an objective standard for the majority opinion’s subjective test. As a re-
sult, the question in WIC Radio was not whether the defendant honestly 
                                                                                                             
48
 Id., at para. 2. 
49
 Id. But see para. 16 (recognizing that Canadian courts have “frequently pointed to the 
need to develop the common law in accordance with Charter values”). 
50
 The difference between the two is that freedom of expression is explicitly protected by  
s. 2(b) of the Charter, and reputation is not. It is only by viewing the text as irrelevant that the two 
values can be treated as equivalent.  
51
 Id., at para. 36 (stating, “I do not think abolition of the requirement of honest belief, how-
ever formulated, would be ‘incremental’”). 
52
 Id., at para. 39. 
53
 Id., (emphasis added). 
54
 Id., at para. 45. 
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believed the defamatory comment, but whether any person could  
honestly hold that opinion.55 Justice Binnie thought that this improve-
ment to the fair comment doctrine would accommodate expressive 
freedom, as few comments would fail the “any man” version of honest 
belief.56 
Meanwhile, LeBel J. joined issue at the level of principle and wrote 
an iconoclastic concurrence which took aim at key elements of the com-
mon law doctrine. Without challenging the trial judge’s finding, he 
nonetheless registered his disagreement with the conclusion that the edi-
torial was prima facie defamatory.57 In making that argument LeBel J. 
observed that opinions are not like facts; they are not taken at face value; 
they may or may not be believed; and, they may or may not be defama-
tory.58 From that perspective, the question is not whether the words 
impute negative qualities to an individual, but whether the public would 
think less of that person because of the comment.59 He found, in the con-
text of WIC Radio, that Mair’s comments “would likely not have led 
‘right-thinking’ members of the public to think less of Simpson”, and 
posed “no realistic threat” to her reputation.60 He concluded that if Mair’s 
editorial was caught by the traditional test, then it should be modified to 
reflect current values, including section 2(b)’s protection of expressive 
freedom.61  
While other members of the Court were content to adopt the pre-
Charter dissent in Cherneskey, LeBel J. was willing to re-think the fun-
damental assumptions of fair comment and modify the doctrine in 
response to the Charter’s requirements.62 In his view, the honest belief 
                                                                                                             
55
 The test, as articulated by Binnie J. is whether “anyone could honestly have expressed the 
defamatory comment on the proven facts”; id., at para. 49 (heading). The question in WIC Radio was 
whether “the defamatory imputation that Kari Simpson ‘would condone violence toward gay people’ 
is an opinion that could be held by an honest person in the circumstances”; id., at para. 61. 
56
 Id., at paras. 40, 48, and 50. 
57
 Id. 
58
 Justice LeBel cautioned that courts should not be “too quick” to find defamatory mean-
ing, especially in the case of opinions: Id., at para. 69. He explained that “[i]t would quite simply be 
wrong to assume that the public always takes statements of opinion at face value” (id., at para. 73), 
and concluded that “it cannot be consistent with the Charter value of freedom of expression to treat 
spirited statements of opinion in a debate on matters of public interest as being prima facie defama-
tory” (id., at para. 79). 
59
 Id., at para. 69 (proposing a list of relevant factors which includes whether the words are 
a statement of opinion rather than a statement of fact; how much is publicly known about the plain-
tiff; the nature of the audience; and the context of the comment). 
60
 Id., at paras. 69 and 78. 
61
 Id., at para. 79. 
62
 Justice Rothstein concurred in LeBel J.’s abolition of honest belief, but not his views 
about the standard for prima facie defamation: id., at paras. 108-112. 
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element “no longer offers anything of value” in balancing interests, and it 
is “no longer justifiable” to judge comment or opinion “on an objective 
basis”.63 He reasoned that if an objective standard cannot ask whether a 
belief is reasonable without encroaching on expressive freedom,64 then it 
is reduced to a requirement that the belief have a basis in facts.65 But nor 
did it make sense to define belief that way, because fair comment pre-
supposes a factual foundation, and duplicating it as an aspect of honest 
belief provides no additional protection for reputation.66 Essentially, Le-
Bel J. concluded that, no matter how it was defined, honest belief was 
incoherent: any content-based standard of reasonableness was impermis-
sible, and any other objective requirement, such as a foundation in facts, 
would duplicate an existing element of the doctrine.67 
Justice LeBel held that eliminating honest belief was an incremental 
change that the Court had the power and responsibility to make, because 
the common law had fallen “out of step with its underlying principles 
and with modern values”, and the test had proved to be “unworkable or 
to serve no useful purpose”.68 Under his approach, fair comment would 
be available on proof that the words were a comment and not a statement 
of fact, on a matter of public interest, and were grounded in the facts.69  
Justice Binnie’s majority opinion recognized that Cherneskey was 
unacceptable, but nonetheless protected the traditional concept of fair 
comment from change. On the positive side, he endorsed an objective 
standard and eliminated “fairness” from the fair comment doctrine. As a 
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 Id., at para. 85. 
64
 Id., at para. 99 (stating that “a requirement of objective honest belief is an inappropriate 
one, in that it places a reasonableness restriction on the opinions a person may legitimately ex-
press”). 
65
 Justice LeBel reasoned that “[i]f the speaker’s prejudices or inclination toward exaggera-
tion and obstinacy are irrelevant, it would similarly be irrelevant to consider the objective 
reasonableness of the comment aside from the requirement that it have a basis in fact”: id., at para. 
90 (emphasis added). 
66
 Id., at para. 94 (arguing that “the only justifiable remnant” of this element is a require-
ment that the comment be based on known facts, and the Canadian doctrine already includes a 
“based on true facts element that is independent of concerns about whether an honest person could 
hold the opinion”). 
67
 In terms of the relationship between the subjective and objective, LeBel J. maintained 
that the requirement that a person be capable of believing the comment, given the facts, would not 
eliminate the problem of assessing the objective reasonableness of the comment. If it is not a basis in 
facts test, it is unclear how the “any person” test could determine objective belief without resort to a 
standard of objective reasonableless: id., at para. 91.  
68
 Id., at para. 94. 
69
 Although the CCLA also proposed a shift in the burden of proof, LeBel J. essentially 
adopted its position on the doctrinal questions: that honest belief be eliminated and that fair com-
ment be based on three criteria; comment, on a matter of public interest, that is based in facts.  
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result, it is clear that although comments must be honest they need not be 
fair.70 Even so, it is disappointing that the Court was so insistent on pre-
serving a traditional conception of fair comment. Half measures, like the 
substitution of an objective honest belief, may improve the common law 
but leave expressive freedom at risk just the same. 
Not long after WIC Radio, the Court disregarded Binnie J.’s remarks 
about incremental change and created a new defence in the law of defa-
mation. Though the introduction of “public interest responsible 
communication” — or PIRC — also represents an improvement in the 
common law, it could hardly be otherwise under Scientology. Here, as 
well, then, the key question is whether Grant’s PIRC defence provided 
expressive freedom the protection that is required by the Charter.  
IV. GRANT AND CUSSON: FREEDOM OF “RESPONSIBLE  
COMMUNICATION” 
At first impression, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Grant and Cus-
son look like significant victories for the media.71 After years under 
Scientology’s yoke, redemption for expressive freedom arrived in the 
form of a defence that is available to those who publish false, defamatory 
statements, but can show that the content addresses a matter of public 
interest and that the publisher meets a standard of responsible communi-
cation.72 This is how the Court’s concept of “public interest responsible 
communication” fundamentally changed the law without disturbing 
precedent.  
The Court realized in these cases, as it had in WIC Radio, that the 
status quo could not continue. Following Church of Scientology, Can-
ada’s defamation law did not even keep tempo with common law 
developments in countries without constitutional rights. For that reason, 
the key question in Grant and Cusson was not whether, but how, the 
Court would respond to the imperative for change. Working within the 
framework of existing doctrine was undesirable, because it would require 
the Court to engage precedent and address Scientology’s refusal to mod-
ernize the defence of qualified privilege. The U.K.’s Reynolds doctrine 
                                                                                                             
70
 Id., at para. 28 (stating that “the addition of a qualitative standard such as ‘fair-minded’ 
should be resisted”); id., at para. 40 (noting that “the operative concept is ‘honest’ rather than ‘fair’ 
lest some suggestion of reasonableness instead of honesty should be read in”); and at para. 48 (quot-
ing Dickson J.’s observation that “the objective limits of fairness … are very wide”). 
71
 Supra, note 4. 
72
 Id., at para. 126 (summarizing the two steps of the PIRC defence). 
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was attractive because it offered the path of least resistance: a way for the 
Court to atone for Church of Scientology and correct its draconian conse-
quences for expressive freedom.73 By presenting PIRC as a new defence, 
unrelated to qualified privilege, the Court was able to emasculate Scien-
tology and yet leave the decision in place. 
The concept of responsible journalism did not exist when Church of 
Scientology was decided. The central question at that time was whether the 
Court should constitutionalize the common law by adopting the Sullivan 
rule. As discussed, Cory J. reacted strongly to the suggestion that false, 
defamatory statements should be constitutionally protected. The dynamics 
shifted with the passage of time, developments in other jurisdictions, and 
the Ontario Court of Appeal’s endorsement of responsible journalism.74 By 
2009 there was little pressure to draw on first amendment doctrine, with its 
reputation for absolutism, or to rebuff Sullivan’s malice rule, which set the 
balance too firmly on the free speech side. The concept of responsible 
journalism appealed to the Court’s sense of compromise because it repre-
sented the “middle road” between the unmodified common law and the 
first amendment’s constitutionalization of defamation law.75 
In adopting the Reynolds doctrine the Court renamed it as responsi-
ble “communication”, to remove its focus on journalism and open the 
defence up to all manner of speakers.76 In striking contrast to Church of 
Scientology — which treated the expressive activity as valueless — the 
Chief Justice’s majority opinion in Grant explained how section 2(b)’s 
underlying values support the public’s interest in information that is false 
or inaccurate, as well as defamatory.77 This discussion informed the first 
part of Grant’s test, which asks whether the statements at issue address a 
matter of public interest. In doing so it incorporated constitutional values 
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 Reynolds, supra, note 10, and Church of Scientology, supra, note 9. Though McLachlin 
C.J.C. was the only judge in Grant and Cusson who also participated in Church of Scientology, the 
Court was reluctant to overrule that decision. 
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 See Grant v. Torstar Corp., [2008] O.J. No. 4783, 92 O.R. (3d) 561 (Ont. C.A.); and 
Cusson v. Quan, [2007] O.J. No. 4348, 87 O.R. (3d) 241 (Ont. C.A.). 
75
 Grant, supra, note 4, at para. 85. 
76
 Id., at paras. 96-97. 
77
 See “The Argument from Principle”, id., at paras. 41-65 (stating, at para. 52, that “the 
first two rationales for free expression squarely apply to communications on matters of public inter-
est, even those which contain false imputations”, and at para. 57, that 
[i]t is simply beyond debate that the limited defences available to press-related defen-
dants may have the effect of inhibiting political discourse and debate on matters of public 
importance, and impeding the cut and thrust of discussion necessary to discovery of the 
truth. 
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into this part of the test and gave the public interest a generous and pur-
posive interpretation.78  
The second part of the defence addresses the question of responsible 
communication, which is based on the assumption that those engaged in 
public interest debates should be held accountable for not acting care-
fully.79 To promote that objective, the Chief Justice proposed a list of 
seven non-exhaustive criteria to determine whether a communication is 
“responsible”, in the circumstances.80 Though abbreviated from the 
U.K.’s 10-step test, the Supreme Court’s checklist is otherwise indistin-
guishable from its British progenitor.81  
Even before the Charter is taken into account, there is reason to 
doubt that Grant’s touchstones of responsible communication will pro-
tect expressive freedom. The Court itself acknowledged that the concept 
encountered resistance in the U.K., and provided an excerpt which stated 
that “the Reynolds defence virtually never succeeded”.82 The Chief Jus-
tice noted that the early history of the doctrine prompted the House of 
Lords to intervene in Jameel v. Wall Street Journal and urge the lower 
courts to give responsible journalism an interpretation that protected the 
rights of the media.83 After describing those problems and doubts, she 
went on to embrace the Reynolds doctrine uncritically, and essentially 
without modification.84 Unless it is applied in a different way, there is 
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 Id., at paras. 98-109. At para. 106 she stated that “[t]he public has a genuine stake in 
knowing about many matters, ranging from science and the arts to the environment, religion, and 
morality”, and added that “[t]he democratic interest in such wide-ranging public debate must be 
reflected in the jurisprudence”. 
79
 Id., at para. 62 (stating that “[p]eople in public life are entitled to expect that the media 
and other reporters will act responsibly in protecting them from false accusations and innuendo”, and 
that “[a] defence based on responsible conduct reflects the social concern that the media should be 
held accountable through the law of defamation”). 
80
 Id., at paras. 111-126. 
81
 Though Reynolds provides a longer list, Grant treats the British factors dealing with the 
plaintiff’s side of the story as one element, not three. Other differences do not appear, on first im-
pression, to signal notable differences divergences between the two standards. 
82
 Id., at para. 71, quoting D. Hooper, “The Importance of the Jameel Case” (2007) 18(2) 
Ent. L.R. 62, at 62 [hereinafter “Hooper”].  
83
 Id., at paras. 72-74. See Jameel, supra, note 10, at para. 56 (per Lord Hoffman, stating 
that the 10 factors “are not tests which the publication has to pass”, though “[i]n the hands of a judge 
hostile to the spirit of Reynolds, they can become ten hurdles at any of which the defence may fail”). 
See Hooper, id.; K. Beattie, “New Life for the Reynolds ‘Public Interest’ Defence? Jameel v. Wall 
Street Journal Europe” (2007) 1 E.H.R.L.R. 81-89. 
84
 Grant, supra, note 4, at paras. 69-74. The Chief Justice noted that Jameel “has been wel-
comed as re-affirming the liberalizing tone of Reynolds and providing much-needed guidance for its 
application”, before stating, inconclusively, that “questions remain”: id., at para. 74.  
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little reason to predict that the Supreme Court’s PIRC defence will do a 
better job of protecting expressive freedom than its British counterpart.85  
Traditionally, the risk associated with the publication of false or in-
accurate information fell squarely on expressive freedom. Subject to the 
defence of privilege, reputation received complete protection at common 
law when the truth of defamatory statements was not, or could not be, 
proven. Over time, courts slowly recognized that the risk of error was an 
unavoidable and necessary cost of public debate, and took steps to re-
dress the imbalance in common law doctrine. Whether the Charter 
directly applies or not, the Court has consistently held that the common 
law must evolve in step with the Charter and its values.86 The question in 
this instance is whether the Court’s response satisfies section 2(b)’s re-
quirements. The PIRC defence is conceptually and doctrinally a British 
mechanism, and though the public interest element is acceptable, the rest 
of the test and its standard of responsible communication neither consid-
ers nor reflects the constitutional requirements of expressive freedom. 
The Chief Justice claimed that the Court’s choice was “buttressed by the 
argument from Charter principles”, but failed to explain how Grant’s 
replica of responsible journalism responds to the Charter.87  
One problem is that the PIRC defence is poorly designed to protect 
expressive freedom. In structural terms, the two parts of the test are not 
in balance. The public interest element involves the judge and jury, but 
applies a generous and relatively straightforward test to determine, in the 
first instance, whether the defence is engaged. A prima facie finding on 
that issue is followed by the second part of the test, which conducts a 
complex and extensive analysis on the question of responsible communi-
cation. The purpose of this step is not to protect expressive freedom but 
to make it as difficult as possible for it to prevail.88 It is not difficult to 
see that attention will focus on that issue, with the result that the public 
interest and its connection to section 2(b)’s underlying values, will be 
overshadowed, or even forgotten, in the process. Another problem is that 
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 For a thorough pre-Jameel assessment of Reynolds, see R. Weaver, et al., “Defamation 
Law and Free Speech: Reynolds v. Times Newspapers and the English Media” (2004) 37 Vand. J. 
Transnat’l L.J. 1255. 
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 Grant, supra, note 4, at para. 44 (stating that “[t]he constitutional status of freedom of 
expression under the Charter means that all Canadian laws must conform to it” and that the com-
mon law, “though not directly subject to Charter scrutiny where disputes between private parties are 
concerned, may be modified to bring it into harmony with the Charter”) (emphasis added). 
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 Id., at para. 86. 
88
 According to Hooper, “the Reynolds defence virtually never succeeded because the 10 
pointers of responsible journalism were treated by the judges as hurdles to be surmounted” (empha-
sis added). Supra, note 82. 
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the new defence places the onus on those whose statements have consti-
tutional value to establish that they meet a standard of responsible 
communication. The reverse onus may be part of defamation law’s re-
gime of strict liability, but it is contrary to general principles of tort law, 
as well as to the principle that infringements of expressive freedom must 
be justified.  
In addition, the concept of responsible communication is difficult to 
reconcile with the Court’s approach to fair comment in WIC Radio. 
There, the Court eliminated fairness from the doctrine, because retaining 
that requirement was patently inconsistent with a commitment to wide-
ranging debate on matters of public interest.89 Though defamatory opin-
ions can be as irresponsible as false statements of fact, it did not take the 
Court long after its decision in WIC Radio to endorse “fairness” as the 
guiding principle of responsible communication. Whereas irresponsibil-
ity short of malice is not actionable under WIC Radio, false or inaccurate 
statements are actionable under Grant unless the publisher can prove due 
diligence. In failing to explain why fairness was eliminated from fair 
comment, only to become the touchstone of responsible communication, 
the Court seemed unaware of the inconsistency.  
The deeper problem is that, in principle, the criteria of responsible 
communication are at odds with the fundamental assumptions of the sec-
tion 2(b) jurisprudence. Nowhere else is the exercise of expressive 
freedom subject to a standard such as Grant’s; expression can be limited 
when it causes harm, but not simply because it is unfair or irresponsible. 
From that perspective, the movement to a standard of fairness, responsi-
ble conduct and due diligence represents a significant shift, not only in 
defamation law but, more generally, in the section 2(b) jurisprudence.90 
In place of the harm principle, which determines the justifiability of lim-
its on expressive freedom, the Court adopted a standard of fairness and 
responsibility. Not only did Grant depart from principle with that stan-
dard, the Court also incorporated privacy concerns into its conception of 
responsible communication.91 Adding the protection of privacy further 
obscures the publication of false statements as the basis of the tort and, in 
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 Supra, note 70. 
90
 The Court used the following language, repeatedly and consistently, to express its stan-
dard of responsible communication: it spoke of diligence, reasonable diligence, reasonable steps, 
fairness, and responsible conduct, and contrasted these qualities with irresponsible reporting and 
actions which are inherently unfair. Grant, supra, note 4, at paras. 111-126 (discussing the elements 
of responsible communication).  
91
 Id., at paras. 59 and 111 (explicitly introducing privacy directly into the defamation 
analysis). 
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doing so, poses a risk that individuals will be held liable for privacy vio-
lations which would not have been actionable under the pre-Grant rules 
of defamation law.92  
Meanwhile, the Court’s discussion of qualified privilege was limited 
to an explanation of the reasons responsible communication should be 
viewed as a new defence.93 Essentially, the difficulty with a single de-
fence was that qualified privilege and responsible journalism ask 
different questions and give different answers. For instance, the Chief 
Justice noted that qualified privilege rests on a principle of reciprocal 
duty and interest which is not grounded in expressive freedom’s values, 
and does not translate to the concept of publication to the world at 
large.94 She also found responsible journalism’s focus on due diligence 
an “uneasy fit” with a defence that can be defeated by malice.95 Finally, it 
is the occasion on which publication occurs that determines the existence 
of a privilege, and though the defence can be defeated by malice, the 
publisher’s conduct — and whether fair, unfair, or otherwise — does not 
matter.96 By contrast, the PIRC defence turns on whether the publisher’s 
actions are responsible or irresponsible.97  
It is true that qualified privilege, as traditionally construed, placed 
constraints on the availability of the defence, but it does not follow that 
responsible communication is the answer. In that regard, it is unfortunate 
that the Court did not consider an alternative which would recognize a 
public interest privilege or defence for publications at large. Under an 
approach along such lines, statements which satisfy the public interest 
criterion could prima facie be protected, but still be actionable where the 
plaintiff establishes harm to reputation. On that issue, the PIRC’s stan-
dard of due diligence, fairness, reasonableness and responsible conduct 
sets too low a threshold to protect expressive activity which has constitu-
tional value.98 It is more consistent with Charter values to require the 
plaintiff to establish subjective fault; in this context, that means showing 
that the defendant knew the material was false, or was reckless in  
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 Though truth remains a complete defence, the point is to draw attention to the incorpora-
tion of privacy into a tort that has traditionally been associated with harm to reputation. Despite 
overlap between the two, the law of defamation previously did not protect privacy interests. 
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 See id., at paras. 88-95. 
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 Id., at paras. 93 and 94. 
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 Id., at para. 92 (suggesting, essentially, that malice is irrelevant under the PIRC defence 
because the requirements of responsible communication cannot be met when malice is present). 
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 Id., at para. 90. 
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 Id. 
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 Supra, note 90. 
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publishing it without knowing whether it was true or false. A doctrine of 
this kind chooses a point between PIRC’s objective criteria and malice at 
common law; it sets a higher threshold than responsible communication, 
and a lower one than malice, which is defined, at common law, as having 
a dominant motive of spite or ill will, or otherwise having an indirect 
motive or ulterior purpose.99 Under this alternative, fault is based on 
what the publisher knew about the accuracy of the statements, and is oth-
erwise not concerned with whether the publisher has been responsible or 
not.  
There are several reasons a public interest privilege or defence based 
on a standard of subjective fault is preferable to Grant’s PIRC defence. 
First of all, the proposal is consistent with the values, requirements and 
structure of the Charter. It replaces qualified privilege’s outdated concept 
of duty with a definition of the public interest that is in keeping with sec-
tion 2(b)’s values. A public interest defence affords protection for 
expressive freedom but also vindicates reputation where the defendant 
harms the plaintiff’s reputation. For these purposes, harm takes the form 
of subjective fault which focuses on the publisher’s knowledge, and not 
on whether the publisher has been fair or not. This alternative also fits 
the Charter’s analytical structure: a statement that addresses a matter of 
public interest is prima facie protected, and it is up to the plaintiff to 
demonstrate why reputation should prevail over expressive freedom, in 
the circumstances. This is more consistent with the Charter than the 
PIRC defence, which places the burden on a publisher to disprove negli-
gence and to establish that a communication was fair and responsible. A 
further advantage is that modifying qualified privilege along these lines 
would have avoided introducing a defence that has not been especially 
successful in the U.K. A public interest defence or privilege would 
minimize the changes to the common law and offer a doctrine that is 
consistent with Charter values. 
It is unfortunate that the Court chose not to modify the traditional de-
fence, as qualified privilege could have been redefined to comply with 
Charter values. Though doing so would require the defence to be liber-
ated from the traditional concept of “duty”, the Court had the authority to 
take that step. This approach could have set Canada’s defence apart and 
done a better job of harmonizing the common law and the Charter. Yet in 
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 The proposal essentially adopts Sullivan’s definition of actual malice, but refers to it as 
subjective fault to avoid confusing subjective fault in this context with the common law definition of 
malice. For a definition of malice at common law, see WIC Radio, supra, note 11, at para. 101.  
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its zeal to embrace a ready-made solution that sidestepped Church of Sci-
entology, the Court chose to follow rather than to lead. As a result the 
Charter played a visible role in Grant but one that was more gestural 
than substantive, or prescriptive, in nature. 
Though Grant diminished the severity of Scientology’s consequences 
for expressive freedom, the PIRC defence has shifted debate to the con-
cept of responsible communication and what that means. Protecting 
false, defamatory statements which serve the public interest now depends 
on how the Grant criteria are applied. And though the PIRC defence does 
not incorporate Charter standards or doctrines, the Charter can make a 
difference in the way responsible communication is interpreted. For ex-
ample, the courts can take care not to follow the U.K., and resist changes 
in the law of defamation that are aimed at correcting an imbalance that 
historically favoured reputation over expressive freedom. In Grant the 
Court made it clear that the PIRC defence is informed by and responsive 
to Charter values. That not only distinguishes it from Reynolds, but also 
mandates that Canada’s defence must evolve in a way that reflects that 
vital difference.  
The first step of the Grant test can assist in promoting that objective. 
Statements which serve the public interest not only engage the defence 
but, in doing so, speak to section 2(b)’s values. As such, the prima facie 
finding on that issue provides a context for the analysis of responsible 
communication. In particular, the courts should be careful not to treat the 
elements of that test as a series of hurdles for expressive freedom to 
clear.100 Instead, they should require clear and convincing evidence be-
fore reaching any conclusion that a publisher has acted irresponsibly in 
publishing statements that are in the public interest. Any other approach 
would deny expressive freedom the protection that is required by the 
Charter. 
V. R. V. NATIONAL POST: “COGENT OBJECTIONS” TO  
CONSTITUTIONAL IMMUNITY101 
To this point, the article has shown that the Court was unwilling to 
let the Charter play a more direct role in the evolution of defamation law. 
That may be partly because the Court continues to view expressive free-
dom and reputation as equals. Section 2(b) of the Charter altered that 
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equation by granting expressive freedom constitutional status, and that 
change in status should be reflected in the structure of doctrine. Though 
the Court supported section 2(b)’s values in WIC Radio and Grant, the 
Charter had little influence on the doctrines that were adopted in these 
cases. 
Early in 2010, National Post dealt with journalist-source privilege 
and the decision is discussed briefly, to reinforce the Court’s pattern of 
decision-making in cases where common law doctrine infringes section 
2(b)’s guarantee of expressive freedom. The question in National Post 
was whether the common law’s four-part test for privilege violated the 
Charter, in the context of journalist-source relationships and the news-
gathering process. The Wigmore test, as it is known, predates the Charter 
and was not designed to protect relationships which have constitutional 
status, such as those arising from section 2(b)’s guarantee of expressive 
and press freedom. At common law, the party seeking to protect the con-
fidentiality of a relationship has the burden to establish the privilege 
under all parts of the test, including the balancing of values which deter-
mines whether to compel disclosure or protect the integrity of the 
relationship.102  
The issue in National Post was whether a newspaper and its reporter 
could invoke section 2(b) of the Charter against a writ of assistance and 
search warrant which, if executed, would disclose the identity of a confi-
dential newsgathering source.103 As a matter of principle, the fundamental 
question was whether the Wigmore test required modification to safeguard 
the newsgathering process and access to confidential sources. Previously, 
the Court had held that newsgathering is constitutionally protected, and 
had also recognized the importance of reporters’ access to confidential 
sources.104 Regardless whether the privilege was protected in this instance, 
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the common law test could and should have been modified.105 The Charter 
was unquestionably engaged because the state, as singular antagonist, had 
issued coercive orders against the National Post and its reporter, who 
claimed that their rights under section 2(b) had been violated. In the cir-
cumstances, the Court should have separated the journalist-source 
privilege from the other relationships covered by the Wigmore test, and 
altered the test to recognize the constitutional status of the newsgathering 
relationship and give it adequate protection under section 2(b).106 
Specifically, the Court could have fashioned a common law test spe-
cific to section 2(b), as it had earlier in Dagenais, along these lines.107 A 
reporter or journalist claiming its benefit would have the initial burden to 
establish the privilege, but once that was done the onus would shift to the 
party seeking disclosure to justify any infringement of the confidential 
relationship. The first step of such a test reflects the standard requirement 
that the party seeking the Charter’s benefit must establish the entitle-
ment.108 Likewise, the second step reflects the requirement, once the 
prima facie right is established, that the party who would violate the enti-
tlement must justify the infringement.109 In National Post it was a matter 
of breaking up the elements of the Wigmore test, and remodelling them 
to create an issue-specific test for a newsgathering privilege that is con-
sistent with the Charter.110  
Justice Binnie’s majority reasons flatly refused to modify the Wig-
more test in any way. He was adamant that the common law did not 
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require adjustment, and rejected the invitation to constitutionalize the 
Wigmore test, either in whole or in part.111 He acknowledged the special 
position of the news media and the role confidential sources play in 
newsgathering, but rejected the suggestion that the journalist-source rela-
tionship engages section 2(b) or is constitutionally protected.112 Under 
this view the legislature could prohibit the use of confidential sources or 
make the disclosure of such sources mandatory, without any balancing of 
values. According to National Post this would not engage the Charter. In 
any case, Binnie J. held that “the purpose of section 2(b) can be fulfilled 
without the necessity of implying a constitutional immunity” and found 
that a “judicial order to compel disclosure of a secret source would not in 
general violate section2(b)”.113 He thought that the common law was 
adequate to protect section 2(b) because “[t]he public interest in free ex-
pression will always weigh heavily in the balance.”114 With Abella J. 
dissenting, but solely on Wigmore’s application to the facts, the Court 
held that law enforcement outweighed any interest in protecting the con-
fidential source, and found that there was no privilege.115  
In National Post, as well as in WIC Radio and Grant, the Court re-
hearsed section 2(b)’s underlying values and did so, presumably, to 
acknowledge that the Charter should make a difference. But that differ-
ence was not reflected in the doctrines that emerged in the Court’s 
decisions. While WIC Radio rejected the proposal to abolish the honest 
belief requirement, Grant adopted the PIRC defence with its concept of 
responsible communication, and National Post refused to alter the Wig-
more test. Rather than consider whether and how elements of Charter 
methodology could be incorporated, the Court was content to recite  
section 2(b)’s underlying values and then assume that those values would 
be sufficiently protected by common law tests and standards. 
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That approach is disappointing in light of other decisions that have 
imported Charter-based concepts and standards into the common law. 
Though the Dagenais line of cases is the best example, it is not the only 
one and other decisions, such as Nova Scotia v. MacIntyre and 
R.W.D.S.U. v. Pepsi-Cola, should not be forgotten.116 MacIntyre predated 
the Charter, but used the language of justification in proposing that limits 
on public access to search warrants are only permissible when it is neces-
sary to protect social values of superordinate importance.117 More 
recently, Pepsi-Cola applied a muscular version of Charter values to the 
common law, in order to place constitutionally inspired limits on the re-
strictions tort law placed on labour picketing.118  
The difference between these cases and those is this. Whereas 
Dagenais, MacIntyre and Pepsi-Cola modified the common law doctrine 
to make it compatible with Charter values, the defamation and privilege 
cases recited section 2(b)’s underlying values but failed to adopt stan-
dards to ensure that the common law adequately protects expressive 
freedom. It is the difference between simply acknowledging expressive 
freedom’s underlying values, and developing standards to ensure that 
they are adequately protected. By failing to modify the common law in a 
Charter-specific way, the Court’s recent decisions do not meet constitu-
tional expectations, and as a result expressive freedom remains at risk.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
It would not be accurate to say that the Charter did not make a differ-
ence in the decisions discussed in this article. After playing a negative 
role in Church of Scientology, the Charter served more positive purposes 
in the Court’s recent decisions. In WIC Radio, Grant, and National Post 
the Court provided a preliminary discussion of section 2(b) before con-
sidering the status of expressive freedom in certain common law 
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doctrines. Yet rather than structure the common law to reflect the Char-
ter’s concepts of rights and limits, or to incorporate Charter standards, 
the Court assumed that its discussion of values, without more, was suffi-
cient. In other words, as long as the common law was informed by 
Charter values, that was enough.  
In WIC Radio, the Court was unwilling to entertain the suggestion 
that the honest belief requirement served no valid purpose, and was in-
consistent with the Charter and its commitment to uninhibited 
commentary on issues of public interest. Grant fundamentally changed 
the law of defamation but, in doing so, failed to ask whether the British 
standard of responsible journalism was consistent with the Charter’s 
guarantee of expressive freedom. Instead, the Court made only minor 
changes to it before adopting the U.K. doctrine. Finally, the Court was 
adamant in National Post that Wigmore’s four-part test for privilege did 
not require doctrinal modification. Despite the presence of coercive or-
ders against a newspaper and journalist, the Court found that expressive 
freedom would be adequately protected by reading section 2(b)’s values 
into the Wigmore test in a flexible, ad hoc manner.  
At least where expressive freedom is concerned, the Court has not 
taken a consistent approach to the harmonization of the common law and 
the Charter. Though earlier decisions constitutionalized common law 
tests or took other steps to ensure their compliance with the Charter, the 
Court did not follow suit in its cases on defamation and privilege. In 
these decisions the Court resisted the invitation to embrace more far-
reaching change; instead, it both assumed and insisted that the common 
law would adequately protect expressive freedom. Some progress was 
made in these decisions, but not enough, and additional measures are 
required to protect newsgathering practices. The Court’s unwillingness to 
play a more vital role in harmonizing the common law and the Charter in 
this area of section 2(b) doctrine means that legislative reform must now 
be considered.  
  
